The Supreme Court's IOLTA Decision: Of Dogs,
Mangers, and the Ghost of Mrs. Frothingham
DonaldL. Beschle

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has handed
down a number of decisions that have intrigued commentators by
suggesting a stronger role for several constitutional provisions in
challenging acts of the political branches of government. These
cases, which invoke the Tenth' and Eleventh Amendments, and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,3

have sparked widespread discussion.

This discussion has centered

upon the question of whether these cases should be seen as no more

than curious exceptions that do not seriously infringe on legislative
power, or as the first moves of active intervention by the Supreme
Court to protect interests previously given little protection from
legislative discretion.
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in

Professor, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Fordham University, 1973;
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1976; LL.M., Temple University School of
Law, 1982.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34
(1997) (overturning federal statutory requirement that local officials conduct
background checks of prospective firearms purchasers); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992) (overturning federal statute requiring states to regulate
waste disposal in a particular manner).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999)
(holding that federal statute cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court
with respect to alleged violations of Fair Labor Standards Act); College Say. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999)
(holding that states may invoke sovereign immunity in state-court proceeding against
state agency for violation of the Lanham Act).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law
which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . ."); see
also Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1526, 1530 (1999) (holding that state statute
limiting welfare payments to new residents to the amount received in former state of
residence violates Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, which addressed a challenge.
to a state program that helped fund legal services for low-income
clients through the use of interest earned on attorney-maintained
bank accounts aggregating small amounts of clients' money.' A fiveJustice majority held that such a program impacted clients' property
interests and required courts to decide whether the Takings Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was violated.6 The decision in
Phillips, quite unsurprisingly, drew much attention from bar
associations and other supporters of legal service providers.!
Although it is by no means clear that upon remand the court will find
the program to be an uncompensated taking, the possibility of such a
holding and its consequences for the funding of legal services cannot
be taken lightly.
Moreover, as the organized bar and other
supporters of such programs pay justifiable attention to the particular
impact of Phillipson legal service providers, some potentially broader
implications of the decision may be overlooked.
By taking an expansive view of the meaning of the term
"property," Phillipsenlarges the scope of the Takings Clause to permit
parties to overcome normal standing requirements and to use the
clause not for its intended purpose of guaranteeing compensation
when the government engages in an admittedly legitimate activity,
but instead to attack, in a fundamental way, the government program
itself. Unlike almost all prior Takings Clause cases, Phillips appears to
involve only the right to exclude others from one's property; there is
no loss in value or physical occupation of property.
This invocation of the Takings Clause raises several compelling
questions. The first is whether this "dog in a manger '8 activitypreventing others from benefiting from something that is of no value
to the owner-is what the Takings Clause should protect. The
second is whether the recognition of this as a distinct property right is
merely a quirky response to a particular set of facts, or whether it
4

524 U.S.
See id. at
See id. at
See, e.g.,

156 (1998).
161-63.
6
172; see also infranotes 27-45 and accompanying text.
7
Erwin Chemerinsky, Will IOLTA Survive?, 35 TRIAL 80 (1999)
(suggesting responses to Phillips to ensure the survival of IOLTA programs); Leon D.
Lazer, IOLTA and Daubert, 15 TOURo L. REv. 995 (1999);Jason Lacey, Note, IOLTA
Programs and Professional Responsibility: Dealing with the Aftermath of Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 47 U. KANsAs L. REv. 911 (1999).
A "dog in the manger" is "a person who selfishly withholds from others
something that he himself cannot use or does not need." WERSTER's THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 688 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981). The phrase is
derived "from the fable of the dog who would not allow a horse or ox to eat the hay
in a manger, even though he did not want it himself." Id.
5
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foreshadows an expanded use of the Takings Clause to permit
property owners to attack programs that they oppose on ideological
grounds with a stronger weapon than the usually unsuccessful
invocation of substantive due process. Phillips, in fact, is not alone
among recent Supreme Court decisions in suggesting that the
Takings Clause may be invoked in the future, in some new and
surprising ways, to elevate "property rights" above community
interests. Thus, regardless of the final disposition of the specific
takings question presented, Phillipsmay be of lasting importance.
This Article will explore the significance of Phillips beyond the
boundaries of its impact on legal services. Part I will give a brief
overview of Interest on Lawyer's Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs.
This will be followed, in Part II, by a discussion of Phillips. Part III will
give a brief overview of the Supreme Court's Takings Clause
jurisprudence and Phillips's place within that jurisprudence. Finally,
Part IV will explore the ways in which Phillips may be a significant
indication of things to come, especially in light of some related
Supreme Court cases and developments.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IOLTA
IOLTA accounts grew out of an insight, first recognized in
Australia, 9 that quirks in the banking system would allow for the
generation of funds for a worthy social cause, specifically legal
assistance for the poor, without noticeable financial sacrifice by
anyone. Attorneys commonly hold their clients' funds in bank
accounts, which, in theory, might bear interest. However, often the
sums held for an individual client are so small, or are held for so
short a time, that the interest earned is less than the transaction costs
of establishing and administering the account. Thus, in reality, the
client's net interest is zero.'0
If these small sums, however, were aggregated into a single
account, and the costs of allocating interest to each individual client
were eliminated, that account would generate some net interest. The
attorneys would have no legitimate claim to this interest because it
would be generated by clients' funds. Also, the administrative costs
9 See Taylor S. Boone, Comments: A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal
Services, PartI: An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and FloridaAllowing the Use of
Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs
of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 542-43 (1979). Australia, like the United
States, has a federal structure, and IOLTA programs were adopted on a state-by-state
basis. See id. at 542-43.
1o See W. Frank Newton & James W. Paulsen, Constitutional Challenges to IOLTA
Revisited, 101 DicK. L. REv. 549, 553-56 (1997).
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of carving the interest up among clients would exceed the value of
the interest itself. The obvious alternative course of action would be
to have the bank pay no interest at all or, to put it another way, to
retain the interest itself. The creators of the IOLTA concept,
however, realized that another option existed; the interest could be
diverted toward a program to help fund legal assistance for lowincome clients. In this modern version of alchemy, a public good
could be funded without depriving individuals of anything that they
had or reasonably expected to obtain."
Prior to 1981, United States banking regulations prohibited the
payment of interest-on-demand deposits held by for-profit entities,
including law firms.' Thus, the Australian innovation was of only
academic interest.
In that year, however, the regulations were
modified to permit interest-bearing demand deposits in cases in
which a charitable organization would receive "the entire beneficial
interest." 4 Following these modifications, states began to implement
IOLTA programs."
By the late 1990s, every state except Indiana had adopted such a
program. 6 IOLTA funds have been employed, to some extent, to
compensate for recent reductions in federal funding for legal
assistance programs. 7 During the last decade, these federally funded
n See id. Client funds that, as a practical matter, can earn interest
are not subject
to IOLTA those funds are placed in an interest-bearing account. See i& at 555. In
Phillips, the Fifth Circuit made the analogy to alchemy, the medieval attempt to
create gold from worthless metals, to disparage the IOLTA program. See Washington
Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir.
1996).
12 See Peter M. Siegel, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account
Programs: Do They "Take"
"Proet"of the Client?, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 674, 688-91 (1984).
During the 1970s, Canada and the Republic of South Africa, two other nations
with a common-law history, followed Australia's example and established IOLTA
programs. See Boone, supra note 9, at 545, 549-50. The South African plan, however,
was limited to voluntary participation. See id. at 549.
14 See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1989); see also Siegel, supra
note 12, at 688-90 &
nn.96-97.
is Florida was the first state to adopt an IOLTA program. See Boone,
supra note
9, at 551. At that time, federal regulations still prohibited the payment of interest on
demand deposits. See id. at 552. In 1981, Congress made clear that interest-bearing
demand deposits would be allowed nationwide. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 690
nn.96-97.
16 Indiana finally decided, in principle, to establish an
IOLTA program in 1995.
See Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation: Is There an Iota of Pmperty Interest in IOLTA ?, 42 VILL L
REV. 189, 191-92. Not all programs are mandatory, however. A significant minority
allow clients to opt out, and a handful are fully voluntary. See id. at 193 n.9.
17 See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 80. Chemerinsky notes
that
[a] Iternative sources of money have become imperative, and by far the
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legal assistance programs have come under steady attack by
conservatives, who perceive that such programs have negative effects
on the legal system and culture. 8
In light of political opposition to government-funded legal
services in general, the conservative opposition to IOLTA programs is
not surprising. In fact, judicial challenges to IOLTA programs have
taken two different forms. The first line of attack openly has taken
issue with the causes supported by IOLTA-funded legal services
programs, claiming that the First Amendment rights of lawyers and
clients involved in IOLTA programs are infringed upon when those
individuals are compelled to financially support the advocacy of
positions contrary to their own beliefs. 9 The second theory has
avoided explicit consideration of the content of IOLTA-funded
programs, or the challenger's ideological quarrels with the goals
pursued by those programs, by invoking the Takings Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 This theory claims that the
most important supplement to federal funds is state Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA) programs. Nationally, it is estimated
that IOLTAs provide more than $100 million annually for legal
services. The significance of this is evident from the fact that the entire
budget for the federal Legal Services Corp. for the last fiscal year was
just $270 million.
Id.

is See, e.g., 141

REc. S14524 (1995) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (stating that
Legal Services Corporation "has turned into an agency that is trying to reshape the
political and legal and social fabric of America"). Senator Inhofe claimed that the
Legal Services Corporation has contributed "extensive class action suits and frivolous
litigation." Id. Moreover, the Senator stated that the "negative effects of the LSC's
attempts to reorder society permeate our culture, from the business community to
government to churches." Id. Thus, not only has the funding for federal legal
services been cut severely in recent years, but restrictions have been placed on the
types of clients and matters to which legal service attorneys may attend. See generaly
Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practiceof Law, 67 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2187 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found.,
993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st
Cir. 1993). The most prominent academic argument in favor of the position that
IOLTA constitutes a "political exploitation" of a trust, which violates, among other
things, First Amendment rights, was put forward by Charles E. Rounds, Jr. See
CONG.

Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Social Investing, IOLTA, and the Law of Trusts: The Settlor's Case
Against the Political Use of Charitable and Client Funds, 22 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 163, 192

(1990).

U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating, "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation"). Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, this restriction limited only the federal government. See Baron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).
This requirement, however, has been

incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state "shall...
deprive any person of life liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
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government could not "take" the interest generated by clients' funds
without compensation.'
Of course, compensation in these cases
would destroy the program because presumably the government
would have to pay exactly what it received, leaving it with no net
interest to devote to legal services.
All of these challenges were unsuccessful22 until the Washington
Legal Foundation, a conservative public interest group, and a Texas
attorney and his client challenged the Texas IOLTA program" on
both First Amendment and Takings Clause grounds.4 In that case,
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
holding that, with respect to the Takings Clause claim, no property of
the client was involved, thus making the usual balancing tests
employed in takings cases inapplicable.5 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court holding, and
the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the Fifth
Circuit decision. 7 While the Supreme Court's opinion might, in the
long run, have little lasting effect on IOLTA programs, the decision
may contain the seeds of a Takings Clause jurisprudence extending
far beyond that which the Court has previously endorsed.
II. PHILLIPS V. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

In 1984, the Texas Supreme Court promulgated a rule requiring
Texas attorneys who receive client funds "nominal in amount or
[that] are reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of
time" to place those funds in an interest-bearing account.2
According to the rule, the interest earned on those accounts is to be
21

See, e.g., Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 973-76; Cone v. State Bar of Fla.,

819 F.2d 1002, 1004 (11th Cir.) (1987).
Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 974; Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006. Inaddition to
the federal court decisions in Washington Legal Foundation and Cone, several state
courts have reached similar decisions. See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 675 S.W.2d 355,
357-58 (Ark. 1984); Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311 (Ct. App.
1985); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982); In re New
Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.H. 1983); In re Interest on Lawyers'
Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1983).
TEXAS STATE BAR RuLxs Art. XI (1984).
24 See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F.
Supp. 1, 5-10 (W.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 94 F.3d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996), rehg denied
106 F.3d 640 (1997), cert. granted, Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 521 U.S. 1117
(1997), affirmed sub nom. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172
(1998).
25 See Washington LegalFound., 873 F. Supp. at 8.
26 See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004.
27 See Phillips, 524
U.S. at 172.
" Id. at 161 (quoting TEXAS STATE BAR RULES Art. XI, § 5(a) (1984)).
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paid to a court-established nonprofit foundation, which would
distribute the money to nonprofit legal service organizations whose
"primary purpose" is to provide "legal services to low income
persons."" Additional rules clarify the meaning of "nominal in
amount" or "held for a short period of time" as follows:
Such funds, considered without regard to funds of other clients
which may be held by the attorney, law firm or professional
corporation, could not reasonably be expected to earn interest
for the client or if the interest which might be earned on such
funds is not likely to be sufficient to offset the cost of establishing
and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs
and tax reporting costs which would be incurred in attempting to
obtain the interest on such funds for the client.30
In response to the promulgation of the Texas IOLTA program,
the Washington Legal Foundation, "a public-interest law and policy
center with members in the State of Texas,""' along with a Texas
attorney and a Texas businessman who frequently uses attorney
services, sued the justices of the Supreme Court of Texas and the
foundation that receives and distributes Texas's IOLTA funds.32 The
plaintiffs claimed, among other things," that the program took
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants,s but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed.36 The Fifth Circuit held that interest was the
property of the owner of the principal "independent of the amount
or value of interest at issue."3 7 This "plain rule," the court concluded,
supported the plaintiffs' claimss
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the Takings Clause issue. 9 In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court began its analysis by defining the question
presented in the defendants' summary judgment motion as "whether
Id. at 162 (quoting TExAs IOLTA RuLEs R. 10 (1984)).
soId. (quoting TEXAS IOLTA RuLES R. 6 (1984)).
29

3' Id.
32

See id. at 163.

The lawsuit included First Amendment claims. See Washington Legal Found.
v.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (W.D. Tex. 1995). Those
claims were not part of the case at the Supreme Court level.
S U.S. CoNsT. amend.
V.
See Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 8.
See Washington LegalFound., 94 F.3d at 1004.
37 Id. at 1002.
3
See id. at 1003.
39 See Phillips,524
U.S. at 163.
33
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the interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is
private property" subject to the Takings Clause.40 The question,
explained the Court, had to be answered primarily by looking to state
law because "the [United States] Constitution protects rather than
creates property interests. 4 ' The Chief Justice noted initially that all
the parties agreed that the principal held in the trust account was the
client's property.2 After articulating this uncontroversial point, the
Court stated simply that Texas law had long recognized the blackletter rule that "interest follows principal,"4 and, therefore, the State
could not disavow its existence in this case." The Court also brushed
aside a few exceptions to the general rule as not relevant to the
IOLTA situation.4
Most significantly, the Court addressed the contention that,
because the IOLTA funds could not generate net interest for the
owners of the principal, the program could not constitute a taking.
The Court stated:
We have never held that a physical item is not "property" simply
because it lacks a positive economic or market value .... Our
conclusion in this regard was premised on our long-standing
recognition that property is more than economic value; it also
consists of "the group of rights which the so-called owner
exercises in his dominion of the Chysical thing," such "as the right
to possess, use and dispose of it."
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's determination
that the interest earned on the client funds placed in IOLTA
The Court, however,
accounts constituted private property.47
declined to rule on the ultimate questions of "whether [those] funds
have been 'taken' by the State," or "the amount of 'just

40

41

Id.
Id. at 164.

See id.
See id. at 166 (citing Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972)
("The interest earned by deposit of money owed by the parties to the lawsuit is an
increment that accrues to that money and to its owner.")).
See id. at 167. For a critique of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the "interest
follows principal" rule as a matter of Texas state law, see Newton & Paulsen, supra
note 10, at 566-77.
See Phillips,524 U.S. at 167-68. The Court found these exceptions, including
"income-only trusts and certain marital property," to have "a firm basis in traditional
property law principles" and thus distinguishable from the IOLTA situation. Id. at
167.
Id. at 169-70 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380
(1945)).
47 See id. at 172.
4

43
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compensation,' if any, due respondents.""
In disagreeing with the majority's position, the four dissenting
Justices, in two separate dissenting opinions by Justice Souter and
Justice Breyer, put forward two principal arguments. First, both
Justice Souter and Justice Breyer contended that the Court could not
address properly the question of whether any property interest
existed without also considering the ultimate question of whether a
compensable taking had taken place.4 9 Second, if such a separate
inquiry must be made, Justice Breyer argued that the majority's
ultimate answer was incorrect.0
With respect to the first point, Justice Souter pointed out that
the majority had chosen "to announce an essentially abstract
proposition" that "may ultimately turn out to have no significance in
resolving the real issue raised in th[e] case."5 While stating that the
Court should not resolve the ultimate takings question, but rather
remand it, the Justice outlined the "serious" issues reducing the
respondents' likelihood of success. 2 Among these obstacles, Justice
Souter noted the absence of economic loss, of any reasonable
expectation of economic gain, and of any physical intrusion on
tangible property,53 as well as the likelihood that, even if a taking
could be found in the abstract, just compensation would be zero."
These four factors, he opined, not only presented serious obstacles to
recovery, but were so intertwined with the initial question of the
existence or nonexistence of "property" that separate analysis of that
question without consideration of these four factors was ill-advised, if
not impossible.5
Justice Breyer agreed that the question of the existence of
private property should not have been addressed apart from the
ultimate question of the existence of a Takings Clause violation.
Nevertheless, he attacked the majority's resolution of the former
question. The Justice explained that prior cases invariably applied
the rule that "principal follows interest," which the majority relied
upon heavily, only when "principal is capable of producing interest

48

Id.

49

See id. at 173 (SouterJ., dissenting); see also id. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Phillips,524 U.S. at 172 (SouterJ., dissenting).
See id. at 176 (SouterJ., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 176-77 (SouterJ., dissenting).
See id.at 181.

50

51
52
5
5

55
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for whoever holds it."-6 Justice Breyer clarified that "[t]he most that
Texas law could have taken from the client is... the client's right to
keep the client's principal sterile, a right to prevent the principal
from being put to productive use by others."57 It is not entirely clear
that this is a conclusion with which the majority would disagree, as
the majority's reference to the right to dispose of property suggests. 9
At this point in his discussion, Justice Breyer identifies the crucial
point of disagreement in Phillips. The majority seems to endorse the
position that the power to keep others away from one's property,
entirely unconnected to any arguable loss of value or impairment of
the owner's right to use that property, is nonetheless an interest that
must be respected by the Constitution.: Justice Breyer and the other
dissenters, of course, disagree. 6
The immediate reaction to Phillips was strong, particularly
among those closely involved with IOLTA programs and the legal
assistance lawyers whom those programs supported. 6' The decision,
however, by avoiding resolution of the ultimate question of whether a
compensable taking has occurred, does not doom IOLTA. Indeed,
the odds are good that, upon remand, application of the balancing
test commonly employed in Takings Clause cases"9 will result in a
Beyond the admittedly
finding that no taking has occurred.0
important question of the future funding of legal services for low-

57

Id.

Id. at 180 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Phillips,524 U.S. at 181 (BreyerJ., dissenting). Justice Breyer also noted:
And whatever this Court's cases may have said about the constitutional
status of such a right, they have not said that the Constitution forces a
State to confer, upon the owner of property that cannot produce
anything of value for him, ownership of the fruits of that property
should that property be rendered fertile through the government's
lawful intervention.

See id. at 170 ("While the interest income at issue here may have no
economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property.").
59 See id.
60 See id. at 182 (BreyerJ., dissenting) ("Land valuation cases, for example,
make
clear that the value of what is taken is bounded by that which is 'lost,' not that which
the 'taker gained.'") (citing Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189,
195 (1910)). Justice Breyer also notes that "[s]pecial value to the condemnor ...
must be excluded as an element of market value." Id. (quoting United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943)).
61 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 7; Lazer, supra note 7; Lacey, supra note 7.
62 See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (providing examples
of the
balancing test employed in Takings Clause cases).
See infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (discussing the factors employed
by the Court in applying the balancing test).
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income clients, additional reasons to pay particular attention to the
Phillips decision exist.
Perhaps the most immediately interesting element of Phillips is
what the dissenters describe as the "abstract" nature of the entire
inquiry." Moreover, this abstract quality goes beyond the mere
metaphysical nature of the inquiry into the meaning of "property."
The Supreme Court's entire decision proceeds without mentioning a
word about what any perceptive outside viewer would see as the
whole point of the lawsuit. The parties challenging IOLTA are not
aggrieved by any loss of money; quite obviously, they object to the
existence of the program itself, and quite possibly, to the entire
concept of publicly funded legal assistance. Of course, openly
framing the challenge in this way likely would lead to defeat, owing to
the inability to articulate an individual right that had been
infringed.6s Framing the challenge as one based upon the Takings
Clause provides a possible solution to this problem.
What, then, is the significance of the Court's decision in Phillips,
which, while falling short of fully endorsing the Takings Clause
challenge, surely encourages it? Even if it ultimately fails to invalidate
IOLTA programs, might Phillips become a weapon to frustrate
government action in cases ranging far beyond its own facts? In
order to fully address these questions, I first outline some recent
Supreme Court Takings Clause cases, and then speculate as to
whether Phillips signals the Court's increasing openness to the
expansion of the scope of that clause, perhaps far beyond its present
boundaries.
III. TAKINGS CLAUSE LAW-SOME BACKGROUND FOR PHILLIPS

has been
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus applies to the states as well as to the federal
The clause requires that when the government
government."
exercises the power of eminent domain to transfer title to property
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172 (SouterJ., dissenting).
65

For an elaboration on this assertion, see the discussion of standing, infra notes

174-83 and accompanying text.
6

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
("In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute,
whereby private property is taken by the State or under its direction for public use,
without compensation made or secured to the owner is, upon principle and
authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the [Fourteenth
[A] mendment.... ."); see also supra note 20.
67
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from an individual to itself, 'just compensation" to the owner is
required.6 This principle is so firmly established that one might
think that the Fifth Amendment was merely codifying a universally
held rule respecting the inviolability of private property. Yet, in the
eighteenth century, it was not uncommon for states to invoke their
police power to exercise eminent domain without compensation.
Although the just compensation requirement was a constitutional
innovation, it is now so sufficiently established that, in cases in which
title is actually transferred, little controversy arises over its
applicability, even if there is a disute concerning the precise sum
that will serve asjust compensation.
Despite the clarity of the clause's application to situations in
which title transfers, a series of cases in the twentieth century sought
to determine the point at which a government act that regulates
property, but falls short of divesting the owner of title to that
property, will qualify as a taking and require compensation. This is
hardly surprising because the scope of government regulation of
property, particularly real property, has expanded significantly in
recent decades.1 While the Takings Clause is applicable to both
personal and real property,72 virtually all of the standards that the
Supreme Court has established for applying the clause have been
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 116 U.S. at 241.
See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694, 694, 699-700 (1984).
68

Treanor states that "[tihe principle that the state necessarily owes compensation
when it takes private property was not generally accepted in either colonial or
revolutionary America.
Uncompensated takings were frequent, and found
justification first in appeals to the Crown, and later in republicanism, the ideology of
the Revolution." Id. at 694. Treanor adds that "a major strand of republican thought
held that the state could abridge the property right in order to promote common
interests." Id. at 699-700.

See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) ("The
70

modern significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do
hold nontresspassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical
takeover."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmEcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 9-2, 590 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that "nothing could be clearer . . . than that a sufficiently

unambiguous government seizure of private property for public use . . . is
unconstitutional unless followed by payment to the former owner of the fair market
value of what was taken").
71

See RICHARD F.

BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES

3-18 (1966) (providing an overview of the birth and expansion of zoning and
comorehensive land-use controls in the twentieth century).
See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 840 (Cal. 1982)

(applying the Takings Clause to a city's attempt to exercise eminent domain to
acquire professional football team in order to prevent the team from moving to
another city).

858

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:846

forged in cases involving the latter."5
Early cases established that something less than fully divesting an
owner of title to property could constitute a taking,7 while
demonstrating that even regulation that seriously reduced property
value might not.75 In short, the Court established a balancing test so
indeterminate that, in later cases, both the Court's majority and
dissenting oginions could cite the same cases as authority for their
conclusions.
This inconsistency is possibly due to the fact that a
single opinion might articulate several relevant factors that a
subsequent opinion might address differently without declaring
which, if any, is determinative. Supreme Court opinions establish
that the extent to which government regulation diminishes the value
of the property clearly is important." Also, according to those cases,
the extent and nature of the benefit that the regulation provides to
the community are important.9 Moreover, the closer the regulation
See infra notes 74-112 and accompanying text (illustrating examples of cases
appying the standards of the clause).
See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (holding zoning
ordinance unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs property); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a regulation, as opposed to a
transfer of an actual property interest, was a taking).
75 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 356, 365, 396-97
(1926) (holding that zoning ordinance does not unconstitutionally take property by
limiting its use in residential zones); Hadacheck v. Sebastien, 239 U.S. 344, 411-12
(1915) (holding that ordinance prohibiting the use of property as a factory for
making bricks is not an unconstitutional taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669
(1887) (holding that state prohibition statute that forced a brewery to shut down
does not call for compensation under the Takings Clause). The Court in Muger
stated:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals
of their property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the
safety of the public is not, and, consistently with the existence and the
safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened with the condition
that the state must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of their property, to inflict an injury upon the community.
Id. at 669.
76 See infra notes 78-81 and 147-57 and accompanying
text.
Thus, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is cited with
approval by both the majority and the dissent in Keystone Bituminous Goal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1987); see also id at 506 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Also, both the majority and the dissent in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. City of New
York cite to the Pennsylvania Coal decision. See Penn Contra4 438 U.S. at 127-28; see also
id. at 147-50 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
78 See Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497 (stating that the Court's "test for
regulatory taking requires [the Court] to compare the value that has been taken
from the property with the value that remains in the property").
79 See id. at 488 ("Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal
have recognized
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comes to resembling a common-law action to remove a nuisance, the
less likely that it will be found to be a taking.0 Finally, Supreme
Court takings cases inquire into the equitable distribution of benefits
stemming from the regulation by asking if the property owner who
loses value also shares in the benefits that the regulation bestows on
the community."
Not only is it unclear which, if any, of these factors is the most
important, it also is often difficult to assess a single factor without
considerable ambiguity. For example, in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,82 New York City's prevention of the
construction of a tower that would rise above Grand Central
Terminal raised the question of whether the city "took" 100% of the
owner's airspace or some far lower percentage of the owner's overall
right to use the parcel as a whole.8 3 Furthermore, Supreme Court
cases over the past twenty years have failed to introduce a great
degree of clarity to the analysis of these issues. In 1987, in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis," the Court upheld a
Pennsylvania statute requiring coal companies to leave a small
percentage of the coal to which they had mining rights in the ground
in order to protect the owners of the surface property rights from
subsidence of their land.
The statute in Keystone Bituminous, and the Takings Clause issues
it presented, were remarkably similar to those before the Court six
decades earlier in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.& In that case,
which was one of the first significant Supreme Court cases to consider
the question of when a regulation would rise to the level of a taking,
the Court invalidated the legislation.87 The Court viewed this early
legislation as a total taking of the support estate.8 In 1987, however,
that the nature of the state's action is critical in takings analysis.").
80 See id. at 491-92 ("Long ago it was recognized that 'all property
in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious
to the community.'" (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665)).
81 See id. at 491 ("Under our system of government, one of the State's primary
ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their
property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn,
benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.").
82 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
83 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136 (holding historic preservation
statute that limits
use of airspace is not a taking).
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
See Keystone Bituminouw, 480 U.S. at 493.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
87

See id. at 415-16.

a See id. at 414.
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the Court interpreted substantially similar legislation as a relatively
minor interference with the entire "bundle" of rights that belonged
to the coal operator." While in the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal case the
Court saw the statute as conferring benefits on only a handful of
private homeowners, 90 in Keystone Bituminous the new statute was seen
as providing a benefit to the community at large.9' Moreover, just as
the Court had been divided in the earlier case,9 four dissenters in
Keystone Bituminous took issue with the majority's characterization,
viewing the effect of the legislation as the "complete extinction of the
value of a parcel of property."9 3 Essentially, Keystone Bituminous
illustrates the almost metaphysical questions posed by a takings claim
that is based upon a government regulation that falls short of the
classic situation involving eminent domain."
Despite the result in Keystone Bituminous, the Supreme Court,
over the past two decades, generally has been more receptive to
claims based upon regulations that diminish the value of property.9
Several decisions during these decades did not deal directly with the
substantive question of what constitutes a taking, but rather with
various procedural issues that accompany takings claims. 0 Those
decisions are a mixed bag, with at least one having the effect of
making the entire litigation process more favorable to claimants.
These procedural decisions may have fostered greater government

See Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 498-502.
See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. The Court, in Pennsylvania Coal stated
that "[t]his is the case of a single private house.... A source of damage to such a
house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in
different places. The damage is not common or public." Id.
91 See Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 488 ("Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth
is acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal
integrity of the area.").
See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416-22 (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
94 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 506-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95 See generally id.
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of LA., 482
U.S. 304 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 352
(1986) (stating that developer must complete negotiations with municipality before
challenging ordinance); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 189, 190 (1985) (stating that developer must seek variance
before challenging constitutionality of zoning ordinance); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980) (holding that developer must submit specific plan before
challenging zoning restriction).
89
90
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caution in regulating property, particularly real property,97 but they
do not aid in the recognition of a taking in the first place.
The most recent significant decision on the substantive question
of when a regulation becomes a taking is Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.s In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a regulation
of property that renders the property essentially "valueless"-one that
denies an owner any "economically viable use of the land"-will
always require compensation, regardless of other factors, such as the
degree to which the regulation clearly pursues the common good.'
Lucas and other cases involving serious loss of value are of great
°
significance and have spurred much commentary.'O
Aside from
providing evidence of a general pro-property owner attitude on the
part of the current Court, however, they provide little help in
addressing the IOLTA situation. By definition, the IOLTA plans at
issue do not reduce the value of the owner's property at all. This
raises the question of whether there is any precedent to support the
counterintuitive notion that a regulation that neither transfers title
nor reduces value can constitute a taking.
The case that comes closest to supporting such a proposition is
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., " upon which,
unsurprisingly, the Phillips majority relied.'0 In Loretto, a New York
statute required landlords to permit the installation of cable
television in their buildings and prohibited them from demanding
payment from the cable company in excess of one dollar. 03 The
In First English EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme
Court held that a successful Takings Clause claimant could obtain damages for the
period of time that his property was restricted by an unconstitutional statute, as well
as an injunction requiring the government either to abandon the ordinance or pay
just compensation. See 482 U.S. at 320-21. This significantly raised the stakes for
local governments whose regulations were threatened with lawsuits and would likely
lead to greater hesitancy in adopting or enforcing land-use restrictions.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
9
See id. at 1027.
100 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings
Puz=le, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1997); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the
Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663 (1996); Joseph Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN L.
REV. 1433 (1993). For an interesting discussion of the proposition that the Lucas
decision is not very significant, see generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of
the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the
Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENvrL. L.J. 523 (1995).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
102 See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169-70
(1998) (citing
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435, 437).
103 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-24. Before passage of
the statute, the cable company
"routinely obtained authorization for its installations from property owners along the
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installation required a half-inch wire running to the building's roof
and two boxes placed on the roof.'
Although the availability of
cable television could be expected to increase the value of the
apartments, the Supreme Court found that a taking had occurred.'0 5
The Court concluded that a "permanent physical occupation" of
property, however minor, would always constitute a taking.'06 The
Court further explained that "constitutional protection for the rights
of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area
permanently occupied." 07 For New York landlords, the victory was
somewhat Pyrrhic; on remand, the lower court held that just
°
compensation was one dollar.'O
Despite the ultimate conclusion,
property owners can invoke the language of Loretto to rebut
arguments that a de minimis taking is no taking at all.' °9
Loretto, however, creates a clear bright-line test only in situations
in which there is a "permanent physical" occupation of real property.
Essentially, the New York statute granted the cable companies what is
easily recognizable in traditional property law terms as an easement."0
Easements are, for the most part, somewhat tangible, obvious, and do
not present the legal system with serious metaphysical problems. The
right to sue that is the essence of an easement, however, quickly can
blur into a limitation on the owner's traditional right to exclude. If
all of the former are takings, when ordered by government, are all of
the latter takings as well?
cable's route, compensating the owners at the standard rate of 5% of the gross
revenues ...
realized from that property." Id. at 423.
104 See id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Jointly, the cable
and boxes occupy
only about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on the roof of appellant's Manhattan
apartment building.")
10'See id. at 434-35.
106 See id.
107

Id. at 436.

108See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 432 (N.Y.
1983). Clearly, plaintiff's goal was to obtain something resembling the five percent
of Teleprompter's revenue that traditionally had been negotiated by apartment
owners prior to enactment of the statute. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
109 For example, property owners could support de
minimis takings with the
following language: "[Clonstitutional protection for the rights of private property
cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied." Id. at 43637. Phillips,moreover, cited Loretto for the proposition that the absence of a "positive
economic or market value" would not necessarily make property subject to taking
without compensation. See Phillips,524 U.S. at 169-70 (citing Loretto, 524 U.S. at 437).
10The Court, in Loretto, noted that in many earlier cases, easements for the
construction and maintenance of "telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and
underground pipes or wires [were] takings even if they occup[ied] only relatively
insubstantial amounts of space and [did] not seriously interfere with the landowner's
use of the rest of his land." See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.
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Much of the inconsistency of the "taking by regulation" cases
arises from the ways in which the two recurring and central questions
can possibly be answered. The first of these questions asks what it is
that has been "taken," while the second asks how much of the
property has been taken. Cases generally agree that depriving an
owner of "all" (or perhaps even "most") of something will likely
constitute a taking, while depriving an owner of only "some" of
something is far less troublesome."' This statement, however, raises
the fundamental question: What is the relevant "something" used to
determine if there has been a taking? For example, in Keystone
Bituminous and Pennsylvania Coal, the issue is whether Pennsylvania,
by requiring coal companies to support a surface estate, takes only a
small percentage of the owner's coal, or 100% of the coal that cannot
be mined. 2 In Penn Centra4 the relevant inquiry is whether building
height restrictions take only a small percentage of a parcel's overall
value or 100% of the owner's air rights."3 In Loretto, the case turns on
whether New York took 100% of the owner's easement or merely
some infinitesimal percentage of the owner's property rights
package." 4 In all of these cases, each alternative seems equally
defensible.
The importance of this inquiry is due largely to the longstanding "bundle of sticks" metaphor employed to describe the legal
notion of property. While property, in everyday parlance, is thought
of as something tangible, to the lawyer it is instead a set of legal
relations and rights." 5 These rights can be visualized as a "bundle," a
IICompare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(holding that a regulation that takes away all practical use is a taking) with Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of NewYork, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that a regulation
that takes only a limited part of a parcel's value is not a taking).
1
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-502
(1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922); see also supra notes
86-89 and accompanying text (contrasting views on whether statute takes all or only a
small percentage of property right).
113 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136; see also supra note 83 (holding a restriction on
building height was not a taking).
14 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427; see also supra notes
101-10 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the problem of calculating percentages of diminution in value,
see generally Lisker, supranote 100.
See 2 WILLIAM BLACISTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Blackstone declares:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in this universe.
Id. at 2; see also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980). Grey states:
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visualization that acts as a reminder of the plurality of legal rights that
ownership entails. This metaphor raises the question of whether the
owner owns one thing or many separate things. This question, in
turn, leads to the larger inquiry: If one portion of the bundle is taken
away or severely limited, is this a deprivation of 100% of that which is
taken or a minor portion of the whole?
At least since the time of William Blackstone, a key element of
the concept of property has been the right not merely to possess and
use something, but the right to exclude others."" Although not
entirely easy to justify,"' a separate right to exclude has been
consistently asserted."" Still, the affirmation of a right is not a
declaration that the right is unlimited; even Blackstone, in his

Most people ... conceive of property as things that are owned by persons.
To own property is to have exclusive control of something-to be able
to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it..
By contrast the theory of property rights held by the modem
specialist ....
fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership
into a more shadowy "bundle of rights".... [This] suggests that you
might sell of particular aspects of your control-the rights to certain
uses, to profits from the thing, and so on.
Id. at 69.
11
See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917) (asserting that an owner has "legal rights, or
claims, that others, respectively, shall not enter on the land, that they shall not cause
physical harm to the land, etc., such others being under respective correlative legal
duties"); See2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 115, at 208-15 (discussing trespass).
117 The right to exclude is usually defended by contrasting its social implications
with the treatment of property as a commons, which would lead to far less motivation
for individual productivity. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAW
32-45 (4th ed. 1992); Richard Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 2 (1990). Even John Locke, however, often regarded as a patron saint of
individual property rights, was sure that such rights were not absolute:
God the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his Children such
a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of this World, but that
he has given his needy Brothers a Right to the Surplusage of his Goods:
so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his pressing Wants call for
it.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TiEATisEs ON GOVERNMENT 188 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967)
(1690). Professor Carol Rose criticized the "in-your-face rhetoric of property rights.
. suggesting that anything goes, and that the property owner need not care in the
least for his fellow." Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 329, 365 (1996). Rose contends that an effective and productive property
system must combine independence and cooperation. See id. at 363.
118 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980) (stating
that a shopping center may exclude protestors despite the First Amendment);
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (affirming
"right to exclude others" from property).
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sweeping endorsement of the right to exclude," 9 noted exceptions in
"some very particular cases."'20
Legal historians, in fact, have
discovered that the traditional understanding of the right to exclude
may be far too broad.'2 ' For example, well into the nineteenth
century, many states permitted entry onto the land of another when
the landowner suffered little harm and the intruder received a great
benefit.'2
These historical limitations on the right to exclude,
however, have tended to be so overwhelmed in the legal and general
public consciousness by the notion of exclusivity that, when
contemporary limitations reappear, they often are regarded as quite
novel.
A prominent example is State v. Shack,'2s a New Jersey case that
has found its way into some of the most frequently used law school
casebooks on property law.2 4 In Shack, a farmer employed migrant
workers whom were housed for the season on the farmer's
property.'2 The farmer attempted to deny access to his property to
legal service attorneys and health service workers who sought to visit
and provide services to the migrants.Iss When the service providers
refused to leave, the farmer brought trespass charges.'" After being
convicted of trespassing, the service providers appealed to the New
Jersey Supreme Court.'
While the Takings Clause was not discussed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the court's analysis of the nature of the property
right protected by trespass statutes is relevant in attempting to
See 2 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 115, at *2.
3 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 115, *209 (asserting that "the law of
England ... has treated every entry upon another's lands (unless by the owner's
leave, or in some very particular cases), as an injury or wrong"). Yet the exceptions
to the absolute right to exclude were numerous. See Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's
Theory of the "Absolute"Rights of Property, 54 U. GIN. L. REv. 67, 67 (1985) (describing
the wide gap between Blackstone's absolutist language and the property system that
he actually described).
121 See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of PropertyRights:
A Study of
the American Wes4 18J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); Bums, supra note 120; Treanor, supra
note 69.
1
See Anderson & Hill, supra note 121, at 170 (showing that only when scarcity of
resources made enforcement of exclusivity economically significant were state
governments pressed to restrict entry on another's land).
23 58 N.J. 297
(1971).
124 See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 14 (7th ed.
1996); JEssE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 87 (4th ed. 1998).
1
See Shack, 58 N.J. at 300.
12 See
id.
12 See id. at
301
128 See id.
19

10
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determine just what a property owner does and does not actually
own. The court articulated that "[p]roperty rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end and are limited by it."'2 The
court further explained that "[ilt was a maxim of the common law
that one should so use his property as not to injure the rights of
others ....
[h]ence it has long been true that necessity, private or
public, may justify entry upon the lands of another."'30 The court also
stressed that the farmer had voluntarily allowed the migrants to camp
upon his land, for both his and their mutual benefit 31 At the same
time, the court quoted the following passage from Professor Richard
R. Powell's classic treatise on property law to support the assertion
that social needs, as well as particular relationships, are relevant in
defining property rights:
"[A] n owner must expect to find the absoluteness of his property
rights curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion of the
best interests of others ....
The current balance between
individualism and dominance of the social interest depends not
only upon political and social ideologies, but also upon the
physical and
social facts of the time and place under
" 2
discussion.

1

Shack is by no means the only example of a court-imposed
limitation on the right to exclude, nor is it unique in that it imposes
such a limitation without serious discussion of whether such a
limitation might implicate the Takings Clause. In addition to such
common-law exceptions to normal trespass rules," legislative
limitations have arisen, such as antidiscrimination statutes and
landlord-tenant restrictions, that have not presented Takings Clause
issues, despite the fact that such regulations trim the owner's
traditional freedom of "absolute" control of his property. These
examples also illustrate that the right to exclude is often intertwined
with other elements of the traditional "bundle" of property rights,
such as the right to use or alienate one's property.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
1 See Shack, 58 N.J. at 299.
1
Id. at 305 (quoting 5 RicHARD R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 746 (Patrick J.
Rohan ed., 1970).
1
See RES'AT-EmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-211 (1965) (listing common-law
exceptions to the normal trespass rules). Although some of these exceptions are
based on the consent of the owner, 20 exceptions arise regardless of the owners'
consent. See id. §§ 191-211. These exceptions arise from various reasons relating to
the public good, such as the abatement of a nuisance and the reclamation of goods
on another's land; a broad exception exists for public necessity. See id. §§ 196, 199 &
201-03 (1965).
129

130
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In contrast, Phillips, perhaps uniquely among takings cases,
presented a situation in which the right to exclude was utterly
independent of other property rights and was also independent of
any decline in the value of the private property, either actual or
potential. In Phillips,what is being "taken" is the right to exclude in
its purest form-that is, the psychological satisfaction of denying a
benefit to another. This is the legal equivalent of the legendary "dog
in the manger," a metaphor in which a dog aggressively prevents
other animals from access to something-hay in the manger-that is
of no practical use to the dog itself."l
Over the years, scholars have attempted to define what gives
property its true value-in other words, exactly what the law seeks to
protect when it protects ownership. Most jurisprudence on this
question regards property primarily in terms of market value.'3
Property's value, then, is the extent to which it can be translated into
a dollar amount, which, in turn, can be exchanged for other
property. To regard property in this way surely is understandable.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation for a taking
seems to support the notion that, at least as far as the law is
concerned, the essence of property is its market value. While the
Takings Clause is a limitation on government action, it can also be
seen as an implicit assertion that there is no inherent unfairness to a
forced exchange of property if the property owner receives market
value in return.'Property, however, may have meaning beyond market value.
Some commentators have written of property as, in many cases, being
primarily a matter of "personhood. ,I
According to this view,
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 668 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., 1981).
1
Indeed, the Law and Economics School of thought regards most legal rules as
ultimately reflecting some sort of actual or implied market. See generally POSNER,
suPra note 117, at 29-75 (discussing property rights).
Thus, William Stoebuck, who regarded the compensation principle as
established as early as the time of Magna Carta, noted that, into the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, no compensation was paid for the taking of unimproved or
unenclosed land, apparently on the theory that, at the time, such land "was generally
of little worth." See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L. REV. 553, 582, 583 (1972).
137 See, e.g., MargaretJ. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
Professor Radin notes that "[mlost people possess certain objects they feel are almost
part of themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because
they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the
world." Id. at 959. In contrast, Radin maintains that "[t]he opposite of holding an
object that has become part of oneself is holding an object that is perfectly
replaceable with other goods of equal market value." Id. at 959-60.
13
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particular property is part of what defines an individual; its possession
can be essential in allowing the individual to become who he or she
is."' Property rights, certainly including the right to exclude, can
therefore be essential in protecting the individual against the power
of others or of the community at large.'" In such cases, the question
is whether market value actually is a sufficient compensation for the
loss of property.
These types of cases are not difficult to imagine: a family home
may be taken by eminent domain,'4 a small business may be forced to
relocate."" On an instinctive level, such cases should make one
uneasy. The courts, however, have uniformly answered the question
of whether such losses can be reduced to market value; the Takings
Clause does not distinguish between property that is essential to
"personhood" and property that its owner regards as readily fungible
in the marketplace."m To do otherwise would perhaps present courts
with a hopelessly indeterminate task; therefore, the law allows the
market to determine what property is worth, and even perhaps what
qualifies as property.14
The right to exclude in its purest form, the "dog in the manger"
situation presented in Phillips, however, reiterates that property has
another aspect as well; that is, it gives the owner power over others.
The personhood theories of property implicitly recognize this, but
the power is seen as largely or entirely defensive and therefore is
considered benign or even praiseworthy. In reality, though, the
power over others created by property ownership can become a
weapon not to defend personhood, but instead to withhold a social
good from others for no reason beyond the property owner's desire
See id.
This concept can be traced back at least to Thomas Jefferson. See Stanley N.
Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L & ECON.
467, 473-74 (1976). Perhaps the most influential argument in favor of property
rights as bulwarks against government, however, is Charles Reich's argument in favor
of expanded rights to government largess. See generaly Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Professor Reich notes that "in a society that chiefly
values material well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that wellbeing is the very foundation of individuality." Id. at 733.
For a prominent example of this on a large scale, see generally Poletown
Neihborhood Council v. City of Detroi 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 343 (1925); City of Detroit v.
Michael's Prescriptions, 373 N.W.2d 219, 811-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
4
See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
4
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that singer has a property interest in her vocal style and sound); Moore v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 156-57 (Cal. 1990) (holding that patient has no
property right in the cells of his surgically removed, diseased spleen).
13
1
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to withhold it. Phillips appears to hold that property is not, in fact,
invariably a function of market value. The case suggests that the
power that property creates over others, even when the power cannot
tangibly benefit the property owner beyond the satisfaction inherent
in holding and exercising power, is constitutionally protected. Thus,
the Phillipscase brings Takings Clause jurisprudence into a new area.
What this expansion holds for the future is uncertain at best.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILuPS-ALTERNATIVES

With all of the foregoing as background, the central question
remains: What is the lasting significance of Phillips? This question
can be addressed narrowly by confining the analysis to the specific
question of the constitutionality of IOLTA and the future of funding
for legal assistance programs. Perhaps, however, Phillips may indicate
something that reaches far beyond its own facts. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has issued several opinions applying constitutional
provisions in ways that might signal significant constitutional changes,
but might also prove to be no more than interesting oddities.'" Thus,
in examining Phillips, both alternatives must be given serious
consideration.
A. The Possibility That Phillips Is Much Ado About Nothing
Phillips did not declare that the Texas IOLTA program was a
taking calling for compensation; the case merely held that a property
right was implicated in the program and that the case must return to
the lower courts for consideration of the ultimate issue.'" As the
dissenters in Phillips pointed out, separating the question of whether
there is any private property interest involved in a case from the
question of whether that property has in fact been taken is extremely
difficult, if not impossible.'" The questions, however, can be dealt
with separately; a positive answer to the first question will not
necessarily lead to a positive answer to the second.
i4 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999); Saenz v.
Roe, 119 S. CL 1518, 1526, 1530 (1999); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
174-75 (1992); see also supranotes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases
expanding the reach of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
14 See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998);
see also supra
notes 4748 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Phillips).
14 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 173 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 180 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting
opinions in Phillips).
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A prominent example of this can be found in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New Yor.

47

In Penn Central, New York's

landmark preservation ordinance deprived the owner of Grand
Central Terminal of the option of utilizing the airspace above the
terminal to construct an office tower.'
Thus, more clearly than in
Phillips, the ordinance impaired a traditional element of the normal
bundle of property rights-the right to use property-and, as 0a
result, deprived the owners of a clear potential economic benefit.'
Still, the Court held that no taking had occurred."" Central to the
decision was the Court's analysis of "[t]he economic impact of the
regulation to the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation
has
interfered
with
distinct
investment-based
expectations." 5' Because the ordinance did no more than limit use
of the property to its current, profitable use, and because the
"primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel" did not
include construction of an office tower," the Court held that any
interference with property rights was not so great as to outweigh the
legitimate government interest in "improving the quality of life in the
city as a whole."""0 The Court held, therefore, that compensation was
not required.'15
The Court also rejected the argument that the fact that the
landmark ordinance limited a relatively small number of property
owners made it impermissible. 5 The landowner argued that to avoid
classification as a taking, a regulation must distribute benefits and
burdens with at least rough equality."* The Court, however, noted
that a very large percentage of land-use regulation could be said to
impact different property owners to different degrees. 157 Thus, the
147438 U.S.
48 See. at
14

104 (1978).

119.

The owners contended "that the Landmarks Law ha[d] deprived them of any

gainful use of their 'air rights' above the Terminal." Id. at 130. Moreover, the
owners cited United States v. Causby as authority for the proposition that interference
with "air rights" may be sufficient to constitute a taking. See id. (citing United States

v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
150

See id. at 138.

1 & at 124.
15 Id. at 136.
153 Penn Central 438 U.S.
at 134.
'5

See id. at 138.
133.

15" See id. at
15

See id. (stating that plaintiffs argued that "the Landmarks Law does not impose

identical or similar restrictions on all structures located in particular physical
communities").
157 See id.
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Court reasoned, it would be improper to reject the legislative
determination that the overall community, including the burdened
property owners, would share in the benefits of landmark
preservation.8 This question of the extent to which a regulation
must widely distribute benefits and burdens in order to avoid
classification as a taking can be crucial in any takings analysis.T 9
It seems likely that if the court on remand employs a balancing
test similar to that in Penn Centra46' Phillipsultimately will be decided
against the claim that the Texas IOLTA program is a taking. The
"economic impact" of IOLTA on the clients whose funds are used is
zero, and those individuals are being deprived of no investmentbased expectations. Funding legal services for low-income clients
must surely qualify as a legitimate government activity with the effect
of "improving the quality of life" in the overall community.
If the claimants are to prevail on remand, then it would seem
that they must convince the court to apply a per se test, such as that
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,161 upon which the
Phillips majority relied. In Loretto, a restriction that caused a trivial,
perhaps nonexistent, diminution in the value of property was
nonetheless found to be a taking because it was "a permanent
physical occupation" of that property9 This raises the question of
whether the Loretto principle is applicable only to real property and to
classic examples of "occupation," such as easements, or whether it
can be extended to include the "permanent" diversion of interest
from a IOLTA account or any other "occupation" of money. While
the latter reading seems a stretch, it cannot be dismissed out of hand,
especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastern
EntepTrises v. Apfel.'63 In Loretto, the plaintiff's victory was ultimately
Pyrrhic; upon remand, the lower court held that payment of one
dollar was sufficient compensation.'" Thus, what the property owner
See id. at 133-35.
See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987)
(noting that, even in the pursuance of a legitimate public benefit, the state may not
call upon a single individual to bear the entire burden).
See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (summarizing the factors to be
balanced).
158
159

161
16

458 U.S. 419 (1982).
See id. at 421.

16s 524 U.S. 498 (1998);
see also infra notes 199-242 and accompanying text
(invoking the Takings Clause to strike down obligation to contribute to pension fund
for former employees).
1
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 432 (N.Y.
1983), reh k denied, 450 N.E.2d 254 (1983). This ruling supported the authority of the
State Commission of Cable Television to determine that one dollar was a reasonable
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most wanted-the leverage to negotiate a substantial payment from
the cable company in return for granting an easement-was denied.
Therefore, with the profits to be gained by the cable companies far
exceeding the nominal damages imposed for the taking, the ultimate
goal of the ordinance could still be achieved.
In contrast, even an award of nominal damages would surely
mean the end of the Texas IOLTA program (and presumably those
of other states), at least in its present form. By definition, the
separate interest that would be allocated to each client, after
administrative expenses, is zero. Thus, requiring payment of even a
nominal amount would not only give the client more than he would
have in the absence of the program, but also would exceed the value
that the "taking" provided to the state. Thus, the impact of further
proceedings on IOLTA programs is obvious. A final decision that
IOLTA involves a taking requiring compensation would mean that
IOLTA in its present form must end. Presumably, some sort of
voluntary system, either allowing the client to "opt in" or giving the
client the right to "opt out" would solve the Takings Clause problem;
this, however, might seriously reduce the amount of interest IOTLA
programs generate. 13 Of course, this shortfall could be recaptured
through the allocation of tax dollars, but the political climate in
recent years has hardly been receptive to increasing tax support for
legal services.66
On the other hand, a decision against the Takings Clause claim
will buoy IOLTA supporters because IOLTA, in its present form, will
continue. This, however, will not necessarily mean that the Court's
decision and reasoning in Phillips would become no more than a
curiosity, with little or no importance for the future of the Takings
Clause. Surely, if the Phillips plaintiffs ultimately win, the extent to
which the case will have expanded the scope of the Takings Clause
will be worth examining. Also, it is possible that if the plaintiffs
ultimately lose, the lasting significance of Phillipswill be minimal. It
is also possible, however, that the initial holding, which required an

fee for the installation of cable service. See Loretto, 423 N.E.2d at 323, rev'd on other
grounds, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (noting that the commissioner had previously ordered
that landlords were not permitted to charge more than one dollar for the installation

of cable service).
i6 For example, fewer than 20% of Americans currently check off the box on
their federal income tax forms that indicates that they wish to contribute to the
presidential campaign fund, despite the fact that it costs them nothing to do so. See
Samuel L. Walker, Note, Campaign FinanceReform in the 105th Congress: The Failureto
Address Self-Financed Candidates,27 HoFsTRAL. REv. 181, 221 & n.292 (1998).
166 See generally Chemerinsky, supranote 7; Lazer, supranote 7; Lacey, supra note 7.
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extended examination of the takings question, is a significant step
toward chipping away at long-established barriers to individual
judicial challenges of social programs that offend those who must pay
for them.
B. The Possibility That Phillips Is a Harbingerof a Surpisingly More
Powerful Takings Clause
1. The Return of Mrs. Frothingham?
Beyond the obvious importance of Phillips to the future of
IOLTA programs, there is uncertainty as to the possible relevance of
the case to the future course of Takings Clause jurisprudence.
Analysis of this issue might begin by highlighting a point that seems
quite obvious, but is not discussed explicitly in the Supreme Court's
opinion. The goals of the Takings Clause claimants in Phillips are
quite different from those of plaintiffs in the typical Takings Clause
case. The typical Takings Clause claimant seeks either to keep the
property in question or to receive monetary compensation. 67 The
former goal, which would require a holding that the eminent domain
or government regulation cannot be undertaken at all, will almost
invariably fail. This is evident from the text of the Takings Clause
itself. Except for the requirement that the taking be for "public
use,"'' the clause does not bar the government from acquiring
property from owners who are unwilling to sell; it merely ensures that
the government justly compensate the owner for such an acquisition.
In recent decades, Supreme Court opinions have stated that the
"public use" mandate does not require that the government continue
to own and operate the acquired property, but rather merely that the
acquisition be in pursuit of the public welfare.' 69 Unsurprisingly,
courts are quite reluctant to overrule a legislative determination that
a particular government act furthers legitimate goals.70 Thus, in all
but extreme cases, the Takings Clause is not an instrument to prevent
167

cases).

See infra notes 77- 95, 168 & 170 (providing examples of typical Takings Clause

1
Supreme Court decisions have generally adopted a broad interpretation of this
requirement, equating "public use" with public purpose. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 346 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
169 See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating that
"the Court has made clear that it
will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a
public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.'" (quoting
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896))).
i70 See id.; Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Parker, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (Mich.
1981).

874

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:846

the government from achieving its goals. Rather, it assures that those
goals will not be achieved in a manner that unduly burdens particular
individuals.
In Phillips, however, the plaintiffs' goal was neither to retain
some particular piece of property for themselves nor to receive
monetary compensation for the loss of property. Rather, the
plaintiffs objected to the program itself and perhaps to the entire
concept of funding legal services through IOLTA programs or, at the
very least, to mandatory participation in that program. Earlier,
unsuccessful attacks on IOLTA programs made this objection more
obvious. These claims were based upon the First Amendment,
alleging that IOLTA programs forced attorneys or their clients to
fund speech that supported positions with which they disagreed.'
While courts rejected these claims,1' they at least had the virtue of
honestly presenting the claimant's true motivation: an objection
generally to public funding of legal services and, particularly, to
public funding assisted by funds derived in any way from the
claimant. Recasting the attack on IOLTA programs as a Takings
Clause claim not only avoided the need to deal with these First
Amendment holdings, it also served to shift the focus of the dispute
away from a direct attack on the legal service programs themselves.
IOLTA programs obviously are not the only possible way to fund
legal services for low-income clients. These services could be funded
out of general tax revenues. Other alternatives could derive revenue
only from those who utilize lawyers' services; instead of an IOLTA
program, a state might place a small transaction tax on some or all
legal services and earmark this revenue for legal service programs.
Because this would take an actual sum, however small, out of the
pocket of each client, such a program would be more burdensome
and, therefore, more troubling than an IOLTA program. This
alternative, however, would seem to be clearly beyond constitutional
attack, on Takings Clause or any other grounds.
Apart from the absence of any constitutional basis for attacking
the substance of such an alternative funding program, a challenger
See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st
Cir. 1993); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to IOLTA program).
17
See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Ark. 1984); Carroll v.
State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311 (Ct. App. 1985); Cone v. State Bar of Fla.,
819 F.2d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir 1987); Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 974; In re
Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hampshire
Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.H. 1982); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1983).
7
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would face formidable procedural hurdles as well. With extremely
narrow exceptions,'" a taxpayer will lack standing in federal court to
challenge a government program when the only individualized,
concrete injury alleged by the taxpayer is the collection and use of a
tax for that program. The Supreme Court first enunciated this rule
in the 1923 case of Frothinghamv. Mellon.' 74
In that case, Mrs. Frothingham had challenged an act that
provided money to the states on the condition that the states would
take steps to reduce infant and maternal mortality.'75 Her substantive
claim was, essentially, that the Act exceeded the powers of Congress
and invaded the reserved powers of the states. 7 6 The Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to address the federalism issue because the
Court held that Mrs. Frothingham could not claim the individualized
injury necessary to establish standing to sue.'" The use of some tiny
portion of her taxes to fund the program, the Court explained, did
not constitute a "direct injury," but only established that "[s]he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."'7
The easiest way to explain Mrs. Frothingham's lack of standing
might be the very small amount of money involved, but that rationale
would overlook much more significant concerns. The main purpose
behind the general invocation of taxpayer standing, indeed of all
standing requirements, would appear to be the need to maintain a
distinction between the vindication of an individual right-a proper
role for federal courts-and a challenge to a government program
that one opposes for policy or ideological reasons-something
beyond the proper scope ofjudicial concern. Thus, a taxpayer clearly
may challenge the application of a taxing statute to him, or even the
constitutionality of the tax itself, and claim standing on the basis of
his tax bill.'" When the objection, however, is to the manner in
which the revenue is spent, the objection is essentially political and

173

See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 621 (1988) (holding that plaintiff had

standing to challenge spending program on Establishment Clause grounds); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 86 (1968) (same). These exceptions have been created to
permit taxpayers to challenge expenditures that violate the "specific" limitation on
government spending imposed by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
U.S. CONsr. amend I; see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 590; ast, 392 U.S. at 127.
174 262 U.S. 447
(1923).
17
See id. at 479.
176 See id.
17
See id. at 480.
178

Id. at 488.

See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Reagan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983).
7
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should be decided in the arena of the political branches.'" Mrs.
Frothingham can cast her vote for states' rights and against federal
maternity aid, and she can convince others to do the same, but the
federal courts will not provide the forum for her opposition.
Similarly, there would seem to be no viable objection to the
imposition of a small tax on the transaction of legal services. Were
the revenues from such a tax earmarked for legal service programs,
any objection would in reality be an attack on the way that the funds
were spent and, therefore, would be essentially a political, rather than
a legal, question. Phillips, no less than Frothingham, presents an
essentially ideological or policy-based attack on government
spending, rather than a genuine concern that a discrete and
substantial sum of money has been lost. Yet in Phillips, there is no
suggestion that plaintiffs lack standing. The reason for this is
revealed upon examination of the narrow exceptions to the bar on
taxpayer standing that the Supreme Court has created. By far, the
most prominent of these exceptions is the rule that a taxpayer may
challenge a government program that provides funds to religious
organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause.'8 ' Although
these cases can be difficult to fully explain,"' the exception seems to
rest upon the idea that the Establishment Clause grants to individuals
a personal right to be free of government-supported religion; that
idea transforms these disputes from mere matters of policy into
legitimate claims of individual rights.83 In other words, while framed
as taxpayer standing cases, they actually rest not so much on the
injury to the individual's pocketbook, but rather on the personal
rights granted by the Establishment Clause.84
180
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("IT]he Court has refrained from
adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches.") (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)).
, See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 590 (1988) (holding that plaintiff had
standing to challenge expenditures of tax funds on Establishment Clause grounds);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 125 (1968) (same).
182 The Supreme Court's decision in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), made explaining the
Establishment Clause exception even more challenging. In that case, the Court
denied taxpayers standing to challenge a government transfer of land, rather than to
challenge a transfer of funds to a religiously affiliated college. See id. at 481-82.
183 See Fast, 392 U.S. at 103-04 ("The concern of James Madison and his
supporters [in opposing religious assessments] was quite clearly that religious liberty
ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending
powers to aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general.").
184 See id. at 104. In Fast the Court explained:
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In the same way, framing Phillips as a Takings Clause case is a
maneuver that, on its surface, avoids the standing problem. The
objection, in theory, is to the appropriation of an individual's
property, thus establishing an individualized injury. Yet the essential
similarity remains, despite the formal differences between Phillipsand
Frothingham. Claiming that the actual "injury" here is a monetary loss,
rather than the plaintiff s offense at the existence of (or the plaintiff s
marginal participation in) a government spending program, stretches
the imagination. Phillips, as with the Establishment Clause cases, can
be distinguished from Frothinghamby underscoring the existence of a
constitutional provision creating a personal right, that is, the Takings
Clause.
In the Establishment Clause example, however, the
constitutional command is that no such government program shall
exist; if one is established, personal rights are violated. The Phillips
example is quite different. As has been discussed, the Takings Clause
does not prohibit the government from advancing any particular
substantive goal, but limits only the means employed.'85 In the
Establishment Clause standing cases, a searching inquiry into
whether plaintiffs really lost any money is beside the point; the
constitutional provision at issue is not about financial loss.'8
In
contrast, in a Takings Clause case, such loss is the sole issue with
which the Constitution is concerned.
Thus, the recognition of a property interest in Phillipsessentially
transforms an attack on a government program for ideological
reasons into a defense of individual rights. As a result, the Phillips
plaintiffs are able to avoid the standing problems posed by
Frothingham. The question is whether this is of much concern beyond
the facts of this case. Surely Mrs. Frothingham could not have gained
standing simply by claiming that the fraction of her taxes devoted to
aiding new mothers was "taken," at least under current constitutional
standards. It is possible, however, that Phillips is an indication that
the Court may be moving away from those standards. That notion
[O]ne of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the
Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing
and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another
or to support religion in general ....
The Establishment Clause was
designed as a specific bulwark against such potential abuses of
governmental power, and that clause of the First Amendment operates
as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of
the taxing and spending power conferred by [Article] I.
Id. at 103-04.
1
See supra text accompanying notes 168-68 (interpreting "public use" restriction
broadly, giving government wide discretion in exercising eminent domain).
186
See supranotes 183-82.
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might seem extremely unlikely-if Phillips stood alone, but it is not the
only recent example of the Court's expansive use of the Takings
Clause to avoid serious obstacles to invalidating government
programs that present situations quite unlike the classic case of
eminent domain.
2.

EasternEnterprises: A Plurality of the Court Stretches the
Takings Clause Again

In Phillips, the Court extended the scope of the Takings Clause
to permit an ideological attack on IOLTA programs despite the87
difficulty the standing doctrine normally poses to such an attack.
During the same term, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,'" a plurality of
the Supreme Court once again extended the bounds of the Takings
Clause. This time, the Court enlarged Takings Clause jurisprudence
in order to apply a more stringent test than the easily satisfied
substantive due process standard commonly applied to assess the
validity of economic regulation. 9 Beginning in 1946, coal mine
operators and the United Mine Workers (UMW) jointly maintained
trust funds to provide payment for medical expenses incurred by coal
miners, retirees, and their dependents.' 9 Royalties assessed on coal
production funded these trusts pursuant to a series of agreements
between the union and the operators.' 9' Prior to 1974, the trustees
had wide authority to adjust benefit levels and did not guarantee
lifetime benefits for retirees and their dependents.' 92 After the
enactment of ERISA93 in 1974, an agreement amended the plan to
provide for vested lifetime retiree benefits."
As health-care costs
rose, coal production declined, and a sizable generation of miners
retired, the employer contributions required to keep the trust fund
solvent substantially increased. 95 Over the years, a number of
employers withdrew from the agreement, either leaving the coal
187

See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).

524 U.S. 498 (1998).
189See id. at 528; see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("So far as the
requirement of due process is concerned . . . a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purposes.").
190 See id. at 505.
19

191 See id. at

505-06.

See id. at 508, 509.
193The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011003 (1974), commonly known by the acronym ERISA, imposes requirements
relating to funding and vesting of pension plans.
1
See Eastern Enter., 524 U.S. at 509.
19 See
192

id. at 510.
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business entirely or choosing to continue with nonunion
trouble.'9
employees.'9 By 1990, the trust fund was in deep financial
At that point, Congress intervened and enacted the Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992,98 which was intended
"'to stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision of health care
The fundamental approach of the
benefits to . . . retirees.""
legislation was to assign responsibility for miners' health-care benefits
to the companies that had employed them, even in cases in which the
employer had not signed a post-1974 agreement guaranteeing
lifetime benefits.2 °
Under the Act, the Commissioner of Social Security was to assign
responsibility for paying premiums for each retired miner according
First, the Commissioner was to assign
to an established order.2'
responsibility to the company that had employed the miner most
recently and for at least two years, if the company had signed a postSecond, if no such employer existed, the
1974 agreement.202
Commissioner was to assign responsibility to the company that had
signed a post-19 7 4 agreement and was the most recent operator to
employ the miner.2°' Finally, if the miner still had not been assigned,
responsibility was to be assigned to the operator who had employed
the miner for a longer period of time than any other signatory
operator prior to any post-1974 agreements.2 "
Eastern Enterprises (Eastern) had been involved in the coal
industry and had signed the industry-wide agreements created
between 1947 and 1974.205 In 1963, the company transferred its coal
operations to a subsidiary and subsequently sold its interest in that
Pursuant to the 1992 Coal Act, the Commissioner
subsidiary.2
assigned to Eastern payment responsibility for over 1000 retired
miners who had worked for Eastern prior to its withdrawal from the
coal industry and who could not be assigned to any other company.2 0 7
See id. at 511.
197 See id.
1 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994).
1
Eastern Enter., 524 U.S. at 514 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 9701 Historical and
196

Statutory Notes, Statement of Policy (1994)).
2W See id. at 513, 514 (citation
omitted).
201 See id. at 514-15 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a)
(1994)).
See id. at 515.
203

2
"5

See id.

See id.
See EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 516.

26

See id.

207

See id. at 517.

880

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 30:846

The premium for these retirees exceeded $5 million for a twelvemonth period.20
Eastern challenged the part of the 1992 Coal Act that subjected
a company that had never signed an agreement vesting lifetime
health benefits in its workers to liability for lifetime premiums for
those workers. m This retroactive responsibility, Eastern claimed,
violated both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause. 2'0 In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held in favor of Eastern,
although the majority did not agree on the grounds for doing so.2 1 '
Specifically, four justices relied on the Takings Clause, and one
exclusively on the Due Process Clause. 2
The four-justice plurality found no need to address the due
process claim and instead analyzed the case entirely as a Takings
Clause question. Initially, the plurality found "that the Coal Act has
forced a considerable financial burden upon Eastern."2 4 Unlike the
typical takings claim, the financial burden was not linked to any
specific physical asset or fund, but the Court found the requirement
"to turn over a dollar amount" sufficient to trigger Takings Clause
scrutiny."5 The requirement to make payments, the plurality found,
"substantially interferes with Eastern's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 0" 6 This factor, which has been significant in recent
takings cases involving the regulation of land development, 7 can be
extremely problematic because it is unclear that the Takings Clause
was ever meant to serve as protection for speculation. Arguably, if
what is taken is merely the expectation (or hope) of future profit,
See id.
210
21

212
"1

"34
215

216

See id.
See id.
See EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 538.
See id. at 538 (Thomas, J., concurring), 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

See id. at 538-39.
Id. at 529.
Id.
1I at 532.

Thus, in Penn Centra, the Court found that "the law does not interfere with
what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of
the parcel." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 136 (1978).
Likewise, in Keystone Bituminous, the Court found that the regulation did not
significantly interfere with "investment-based expectations." See Keystone Bituminous
In contrast, Justice
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987).
Kennedy, concurring in Lucas, found that it was crucial that a total prohibition on
development would interfere with the developer's reasonable expectations. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032-36 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). For the first significant discussion of this test to be set forth, see Frank
Michelman, supra note 70, at 1229-34.
217
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there is no difference from the occurrence of events that cause any
investment to be unprofitable.
If there is a convincing way to draw the line in these scenarios, it
must depend largely on assessing what types of losses were reasonably
foreseeable, and therefore do not call for compensation, and what
types were completely unforeseeable to the property owner when he
chose to make an initial investment. This latter type of loss, when
caused by the government, presents a much more sympathetic case
for compensation. In Eastern Enterprises, the plurality found that the
retroactivity of the Coal Act, which "reaches back 30 to 50 years to
impose liability, 21 would destroy legitimate, settled expectations that
Eastern would be free of obligations stemming from its past coal
operations.1
While conceding that congressional attention to "a
grave problem in the funding of retired coal miners' health benefits"
was legitimate, the plurality concluded that a solution that "singles
out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount,
based on the employers' conduct in the past, and unrelated to any
commitment that the employers made or any injury they caused"
would violate the Takings Clause. 2"
The decisive fifth vote to invalidate the challenged section of the
Coal Act came from Justice Kennedy, who, along with the four
dissenters, disagreed with the plurality's application of the Takings
Clause.22 ' Instead, he would have subjected this type of retroactive
liability to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.2 Although the
Coal Act "imposes a staggering financial burden,"m Justice Kennedy
noted that it is a burden quite unlike those normally classified as
takings:
[I] t regulates the former mine owner without regard to property.
It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest,
and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest.
The Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer or encumber an
estate in land.., or even a bank account or accrued interest. The
law simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment
of benefits .... To the extent it affects property interests, it does
so in a manner similar to many
laws; but until today, none were
22
thought to constitute takings. 4
218
219
220

EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 532.
See id. at 532, 534.
Id. at 537.
See id. at 539 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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By ignoring the usual Takings Clause requirement that the
government target "a specific property interest,"n Justice Kennedy
argued, the plurality potentially extended the "already difficult and
uncertain" standards of the Takings Clause "to a vast category of
cases" never before thought to present a Takings Clause issue. 226
Justice Kennedy, as well as the four dissenters,2 highlighted a
significant distinction between the purposes of the Takings Clause
and those of the Due Process Clause. m If a government program
violates substantive due process rights, the Justice explained, it
cannot continue. m The Takings Clause, in contrast, does not seek to
prevent the government from pursuing any particular goal; the clause
merely requires compensation when such a goal is approached
through the taking of private property.30 In Eastern Enterprises, unlike
the typical takings case, the plaintiffs' success does not give the
government the option of carrying out the statutory scheme while
providing compensation.
Instead, it invalidates the challenged
statutory provision entirely.2 3'
To invoke the Due Process Clause would clearly be to challenge
the fundamental legitimacy of the legislation. Justice Kennedy,
however, noted that the invocation of the Takings Clause does not
allow the Court to avoid "making a normative judgment about the
Coal Act."232 Certainly, the critique of retroactivity that the plurality
employed in assessing "reasonable investment-based expectations" for
Takings Clause purposes would be central to any analysis under the
Due Process Clause. In fact, Justice Kennedy, in his due process
analysis, noted the severity and retroactivity of the statute and the fact
that retroactive laws "can destroy the reasonable certainty and
security which are the very objects of property ownership."m The
Justice found these to be key factors in his conclusion that the statute
See id. at 542 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
2

Id.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote a
dissenting opinion, see id. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Justice Breyer, joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, also authored a dissent, see id. at 553
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 544, 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id.
230 See id. at 545 (KennedyJ. concurring).
231 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Takings Clause is not
a "substantive or
absolute limit" on government activity, but rather permits "Government to do what it
wants so long as it pays the charge." Id. Justice Breyer made the same point in
dissent. See id. at 554 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
232 See id. at 544 (KennedyJ., concurring).
See id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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was "one of the rare instances" involving "the most egregious of
circumstances" that permit a court to invalidate economic legislation
on substantive due process grounds.2
Though Justice Kennedy's arguments are strong, it is important
to note that, of the five justices who analyzed the case under the Due
Process Clause, four disagree with his conclusion.2 The dissenters,
examining the relations between the coal operators and the UMW,
found that Eastern both benefited from the labor of the miners
whom the Coal Act sought to protect and "helped to create
conditions that led the miners to expect continued health care
benefits for themselves and their families after they retired."2 Thus,
the Justices concluded, the imposition of liability, even retroactively,
did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness necessary to
establish a due process violation.2s Given the long history of the
Court's reluctance to overturn economic regulation on substantive
due process grounds,2 the plurality may have felt more secure
invoking a somewhat more robust constitutional provision.
Another possibility is that several members of the plurality,
having strongly opposed vigorous due process challenges to
legislation in areas such as reproductive rights and other autonomy
claims, 99 found themselves as intimidated by the prospect of a
vigorous Due Process Clause as they were enamored by a strong
Takings Clause.2 It is quite possible, however, that at least some in
the plurality consciously desired that which Justice Kennedy fearedEastern Enter., 524 U.S. at 550 (KennedyJ., concurring).
See id. at 550-53 (StevensJ., dissenting); id. at 553-68 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id. at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer details the ways in which
Eastern Enterprises, while not making binding promises, led its employees to believe
that their pension benefits were secure. See id. at 559.
237 See id. at 559 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1 (1976); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938); Nebbia v. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
239 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have been
strongly
critical of the use of an expansive Due Process Clause to create abortion rights. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944-79 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood,505
U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief
Justices and Justices Scalia and Thomas have also opposed the use of the clause to
advocate a "right to die." See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee the right to assisted
suicide).
240 Justice Kennedy emphasized that employing the Due Process Clause
in Eastern
Enterprises,which involves "the most egregious of circumstances," would not threaten
the general principle that legislation is to be given deference when challenged on
due process grounds. EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy.J., concurring).
234
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the creation of a surprisingly broad range for invocation of the
Takings Clause. 4' In other words, the plurality might have intended
to reinvigorate the essence of substantive due process analysis as
applied to economic regulation, while avoiding explicit reliance on
the Due Process Clause, with its legacy of privacy and autonomy
holdings that three members of the plurality have strongly and
consistently opposed.'4
Eastern Enterprises invokes the Takings Clause to bolster
economic rights to an extent that the Due Process Clause arguably
would fail to do. Phillips permits plaintiffs to employ the Takings
Clause to avoid standing problems in launching what is essentially an
attack on a government program that plaintiffs find ideologically
repugnant. Before exploring the consequences of these cases to the
Takings Clause, one must examine a few nontakings cases that also
indicate the Supreme Court's trend toward protecting traditionally
ill-guarded monetary or economic interests in a more vigorous
fashion by recasting the claim as one resting upon a more strongly
protected right.
3.

Lochnerby Other Means? Some Developments Outside
of the Takings Clause

Phillips and Eastern Enterprises employ the Takings Clause to
bolster arguments that otherwise would need to rest on much more
uncertain constitutional grounds.243 These cases, however, are not
the only recent examples of the use of specific rights provisions in
new guises to bolster either an attack on business regulation or an
attack on government expenditure of its revenue.
Probably the most significant area in which individual rights
concepts have been applied to what is traditionally seen as economic
or business regulation is commercial speech. The Supreme Court's
earliest analyses of advertising saw such activity merely as part of the
act of conducting business, rather than as an independent act of
communication. For example, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,24 the Court
characterized the distribution of advertising handbills as "pursu[ing]

241

See generally id.

242

See supra note 239 and accompanying text (noting that ChiefJustice Rehnquist

and Justices Scalia and Thomas consistently oppose broad extensions of due process
in the area of privacy rights).
243 See supra notes 30-65 and accompanying text (discussing Phillips); see also supra
notes 187-240 and accompanying text (discussing EasternEnteprises).
244

316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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a gainful occupation. 45 Regulation of that distribution, then, was
the regulation of business activity. 24 Only a few years earlier, the
Court had overruled the doctrine enunciated in Lochner v. New York, 7
which required heightened scrutiny for government regulation of
business activity under the Due Process Clause.24' That the Court
would view Valentine as merely another step in the long-standing
constitutional struggle over the freedom to contract instead of as
primarily a case involving the right of free speech is unsurprising.'4
By 1980, however, the Court viewed commercial speech, that is,
speech that does "'no more than propose a commercial
transaction,'' 25 primarily as speech, rather than merely as the act of
selling, and therefore as being entitled to at least limited First
Amendment protection. "' Over the last two decades, although the
trend has not been entirely smooth, the level of protection afforded
to commercial speech has expanded to the point at which, so long as
the speech is not untrue or misleading, 52' approaches that given to
noncommercial speech. 5 3 Business activity, as such, receives only
minimal Fourteenth Amendment protection, while recharacterizing
advertising as something other than simply conducting business raises
the constitutional bar. On a related front, Supreme Court decisions
equating political contributions to speech effectively strengthen the
power of businesses (as well as other moneyed interests) to further
their political goals! " On the whole, the Court's willingness to view
2
Id. at 54 ("Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful
occupation in the streets ...are matters for legislative judgment.").
246

See id. at 55.

198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (holding that a state limitation on the working hours
of
bakers violated the Due Process Clause).
24
The Lochner principle was overruled in a series of cases during the 1930s,
most
notably West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379, 414 (1937).
2
The extension of First Amendment protection to advertising can be seen as a
"renovation" of "the values of Lochner v. New York." Thomas H. Jacobson & John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1979).
250 Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)). A somewhat different definition is contained in CentralHudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (stating that
commercial speech is "expression solely related to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience").
2.51 See CentralHudson,447 U.S.
at 561-62.
252 See id. at 566 ("For commercial speech to come
within [the First Amendment],
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.").
25
See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm'n, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
247
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the pursuit of economic gain as the exercise of highly protected First
Amendment rights has led some commentators to suggest that
business and economic interests have found a way to secure
constitutional protection comparable to that afforded in the days of
Lochnerm5
Phillips,of course, is not about the protection of business activity,
but rather about objecting to the manner in which a government
agency uses one's property. Analogous First Amendment cases are
not hard to find; in several recent cases, students at public
universities have challenged the use of student activity fees to
subsidize student groups whose goals include the propagation of
messages with which the objecting students disagree.'2
Those
students have claimed the right to withhold some portion of their
assessed fees on the grounds that a First Amendment violation occurs
by forcing them to support, and thus be identified with, a program's
message with which they disagree.27 The university defendants
responded that the fees do no more than create and sustain an open
forum for the presentation of diverse views, and that, as long as the
program is not operated in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner, no
student is identified with, or forced to support, any particular view. 2
Lower courts have split on the question of whether the objecting
students' rights have been violated;m the Supreme Court will hear
the issue shortly.2
Regardless of the Supreme Court's final disposition of this issue,
the claims seem analogous to that in Phillips.&' Indeed, if one adds
765, 784 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 249, at 130-31. For examination of the
hazy line between the regulation of commerce and the regulation of
communication, see generally Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, Commerce &
Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697 (1993) (arguing for restrictions on commercial
speech); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747 (1993) (tracing the Court's shift in its understanding of
whether these cases were primarily regulations of speech or conduct).
See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 718-19 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub.
nom., Board of Regents v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999); Rounds v. Oregon
State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999); Carroll v. Blinken,
957 F.2d 991, 995 (2d Cir. 1992); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1360
(M.D.N.C. 1974).
257 See, e.g., Southworth, 151 F.3d
at 718-19.
2M See, e.g., Carroll,957 F.2d
at 999-1001.
M
See supra note 256 (providing examples of lower-court decisions reaching
different conclusions on the issue).
2W The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
to review the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Southworth. SeeSouthworth, 119 S. Ct. at 1332.
26
See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163 (1998).
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the suggestion of Eastern Enterprises that a government-ordered
transfer of funds from A to B creates Takings Clause concerns, 2 it is
difficult to see why these cases are not Takings Clause cases. Once
again, a small, even trivial, sum is allocated to some program that the
individual finds objectionable. The question is whether the First
Amendment (or the Takings Clause) creates ajusticiable claim when
the government uses tax money to fund some communicative activity
with which a taxpayer disagrees. Frothinghamwould seem to dispose
of such a claim, but recasting what are essentially objections to the
government-sponsored programs themselves as individual rights
claims may be sufficient to overcome this long-standing precedent.
Standing alone, Phillipsmay have little significance outside of the
specific area of IOLTA and the funding of legal services. Against a
background that includes Eastern Enterprises and non-takings cases
invoking individual rights provisions expansively to permit successful
attacks on government programs and to bolster constitutional
protection for economic or business interests, perhaps it is a
harbinger of much more.
4.

A Maximalist View: Phillipsand EasternEnterprisesas
Suggestions of Things to Come?

In recent years, several Supreme Court opinions involving
federalism issuesm and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment' have led to serious discussion about
whether the cases are mere curiosities, limited to their facts, or
whether they signal a serious reworking of long-standing
constitutional principles.m Similarly, Phillipsmay be interpreted in at
least two ways. The case may have little significance outside of its own
See, e.g., Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(1998).
M
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (noting recent decisions expending state
immunities under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... "); see
also Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text
(stating that the right of interstate travel is among the privileges and immunities of
United States citizenship).
See, e.g., Frank B. Gross, Realism About Federalism,74 N.Y.U. L.REv. 1304 (1999);
John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Challenging the Tune: 77e Eleventh
Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DicK. L. REv. 1 (1999); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz
Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges and Immunities Revival Portend the Future--OrReveal the
Structure of the Present?, 113HAv. L. REv. 110 (1999).
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facts and, especially if IOLTA programs are found upon remand not
to constitute takings, may be largely forgotten in the near future. In
contrast, when viewed in tandem with Eastern Enterprisesand in light
of the Supreme Court's general receptiveness to claims of economic
rights, the case may indicate something far more sweeping.
In Eastern Enterprises, the dissent asked, "If the [Takings] Clause
applies when the government simply orders A to pay B, why does it
not apply when the government simply orders A to pay the
government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?"2M While the rhetorical
question was meant, of course, to highlight inconsistencies in the
plurality's reasoning, the plurality might resolve those inconsistencies
by declaring that the Takings Clause does apply in the situation
involving the tax.
At least since Frothingham, federal courts have turned back
attempts to oppose government programs on ideological grounds
through judicial, rather than political, means.267 Phillips, however,
suggests that the Takings Clause potentially will serve to provide an
effective counterargument to the long-accepted bar to taxpayer
standing. If the loss of the power to exclude others from a productive
use of property of no practical use to the owner is enough to support
a Takings Clause claim, the commitment of some portion of one's tax
liability to a constitutionally objectionable program must also be
sufficient. Of course, there are obvious formal differences between
the two situations, but Mrs. Frothingham seemingly lost no less than
did the plaintiffs in Phillips.
In Phillips, the Takings Clause is used to circumvent the "actual
injury" requirement of the doctrine of standing.2
An ultimately
favorable decision for the plaintiffs will, unlike the typical takings
case, require the termination of the IOLTA program. Of course, the
ultimate goal of government-funded legal services may be achieved
through the use of tax revenues,w a type of funding that likely would
be immune from any Takings Clause attack.
267

EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 556 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (addressing a

challenge to enforcement policies under the Endangered Species Act); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (involving a challenge to statute providing that
the CIA budget would not be made public); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (addressing a challenge to construction project in National Forest).
See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (permitting
plaintiffs to challenge the legitimacy of a statutory program through the use of a
takings claim challenge).
2W See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text (explaining that
taxpayers
generally lack standing to challenge, as taxpayers, government expenditure
programs).
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Eastern Enterprises,however, seems to cast at least a vague shadow
upon even this conclusion. In Eastern Enterprises, the barrier to
recovery was not a standing problem, but rather the difficulty of
establishing a substantive due process claim against an economic
regulation." 0 Once again, the Takings Clause rode to the plaintiffs
rescue. As in Phillips,the consequence of a decision for the plaintiff
would end the government program, at least as it was originally
structured. If the miners' health funds were to be preserved, they
would have to be preserved from other sources, perhaps from general
tax revenues. Phillips and Eastern Enterprises, taken together, may
suggest the possibility of a new judicial action against government
programs that seek to redistribute income. Some time ago, Professor
Richard Epstein proposed a vigorous expansion of the scope of the
Takings Clause."7 Going far beyond the point that any court had
gone, the professor argued that essentially all redistributive
government programs, including such progressive taxation, should
be considered illegitimate takings. In his view, the clause was not
meant merely to ensure compensation when the government takes
specific property for the welfare of the community, but in a broad
sense was intended to protect all existing economic arrangements by
preventing government attempts to have one subset of the
population transfer wealth to another." In such a view, the Takings
Clause does not only regulate the manner in which government
accomplishes its goals, it also declares at least some goals to be
illegitimate. 274

Phillips and Eastern Enterprises do not necessarily suggest that
takings law is gradually beginning to grow into a much more potent
restraint on government power over property. After all, only four
justices endorsed the use of the Takings Clause in EasternEnterprises.
Moreover, within that plurality, it is difficult to imagine the usually
cautious and incremental Justice O'Connor 5 as eager to employ the
270

See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (explaining that economic

regulations are subjected to an easily satisfied rational basis test).
71 See Eastern Enter., 524 U.S. at 538 (holding
that the challenged legislative act
violated the Takings Clause); see also supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in EasternEnterpises).

2n See generaUy RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF

EMINENTDOMAIN (1985).

M3 See id. at 283-305 (arguing that taxation that
aims at redistributing income is
unconstitutional).

27
7

See id.

See CASS R.

SUNSTEIN,

SUPREME COURT 9 (1999)

ONE CASE AT A TIME:

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

("[Justice O'Connor] tends to be a minimalist. I
understand the term to refer to judges who seek to avoid broad rules and abstract
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Takings Clause to radically limit government power.
Still, the seeds of such a radical step may well be present in these
cases, regardless of whether, ultimately, Phillips is resolved in favor or
against the Texas IOLTA program. The lasting significance of Phillips
is that it allows a plaintiff who has lost nothing beyond the right to
exclude others from the use of property to claim an injury sufficient
to maintain standing to challenge the government act. Combined
with the suggestion in Eastern Enterprises that the imposition of an
obligation to pay money can implicate the Takings Clause, regardless
of whether it involves an identifiable bank account or other source of
funds, Phillipsmay provide the tools for constructing a Takings Clause
of far more significance than previously imagined.
5.

What Should the Takings Clause Protect?: A Brief
Postscript

The language and history of the Takings Clause seem to indicate
that, as Justice Kennedy and the dissenters in Eastern Enterprises
maintain,276 it was not intended to prevent the government from
engaging in activity that could legitimately be seen as furthering
public welfare. Instead, the Takings Clause was meant only to ensure
compensation for deprivations of specific property interests. To
employ the clause as a weapon to attack the imposition of a monetary
obligation, as in Eastern Enterprises,2" or to attack an expenditure of
funds in a manner that a plaintiff finds ideologically objectionable, as
2 seems far beyond the proper scope of the provision. Of
in Phillips,"
course, this does not mean that monetary assessments may not be
challenged.
The proper standard for assessing their validity,
however, is the relatively permissive standard of substantive due
process.2" Similarly, a challenge such as that presented in Phillips
should be assessed for what it is-a First Amendment claim. As in all
such claims, though, the first requisite step for the plaintiff is to
establish a sufficient injury to warrant standing." °
Moreover, it is unclear whether a deprivation that cannot be
theories, and attempt to focus their attention only on what is necessary to resolve
particular disputes.").
276 See EasternEnter., 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also id. at 554
(BreyerJ., dissenting).
277

See id. at 538.

See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (discussing generally applied,
low-level scrutiny utilized in substantive due process challenges to economic
rejulation).
See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (discussing taxpayer standing).
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translated into a dollar amount should be subject to the Takings
Clause. Clearly, the true value of property cannot be reduced
entirely to its dollar value. A number of commentators have stressed
the extent to which at least some property is essential to one's
"personhood"-one's unique sense of self.2 8' Thus, the family home
may be a substantially different type of property than a share in a
mutual fund. One might easily conclude that "personhood" property
should be protected more strongly than other types of property.
Perhaps the government should be barred from acquiring such
property altogether; at the very least, the inadequacy of2 equating just
compensation with market value should be recognized. 82
Not surprisingly, courts have consistently rejected this line of
argument.283 Not only is the law of eminent domain indifferent to the
type of property acquired by the state,2 but the valuation of just
compensation is solely a function of market value, with no
enhancement for subjective loss.2 To a great extent, this is obviously
a consequence of the enormous difficulties that would flow from
allowing compensation for subjective or "personhood" losses.
Perhaps even more significant is the difficulty of drawing the line
between the extent to which property legitimately gives one freedom
from undue control by others and the extent to which it gives one
power over others.
Usually, these two elements are mixed together in a way that
makes separating and comparing their relative weights uncertain.
Owning one's own house gives the owner a legitimate, valuable sense
of control over an aspect of the owner's life, but it also may give the
owner power to frustrate legitimate community goals by refusing to
sell to make way for a public use. The Takings Clause, then, and the
jurisprudence developed under the clause, reach a compromise by
limiting both the owner's power to frustrate the community and the
community's power through the requirement ofjust compensation at
market value.
Phillips seems to present a situation in which the intangible
property right involved is entirely power over others, rather than the
ability to be free of the power of others. It is difficult to see how this
2
See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of at
least some forms of property to personal freedom and identity).
282 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text
(asserting that some property
has value beyond market value).
See supra notes 137-38.
See id.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (stating that objective market value
is the standard for compensation in eminent domain cases).
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should be afforded more constitutional protection than the
nonmarket-based "personhood" aspects of property routinely ignored
in normal eminent domain situations. Yet Phillips gives strong
constitutional protection to a property right with no market value.
The practical and theoretical difficulties presented by using the
Takings Clause to protect property rights beyond those that have
market value are enormous. If that is to be done, however, those
aspects of property that afford the owner power over the community
do not deserve more respect than those that allow one to tend one's
own garden free from the power of others.
CONCLUSION

The Phillips decision has attracted much attention, most of
which, however, has focused on the decision's impact on the future
of IOLTA programs and the funding of legal services. Surely this is
an important issue, but the significance of Phillips may, in the long
run, extend far beyond IOLTA. Even if the court ultimately holds
that the Texas IOLTA program is not a taking, the decision has
established that the deprivation of the right to exclude, standing
alone and with no monetary loss attached, can implicate the Takings
Clause. Combined with the reasoning of the plurality in Eastern
Enterprises, Phillips may well signal the willingness of the current
Supreme Court to sharply expand the possible scope of the Takings
Clause.
The Takings Clause was not meant to prevent the government
from pursuing legitimate goals; it was meant only to assure that no
individual would be unduly burdened in the process of doing so.
Long-standing rules limiting taxpayer standing in federal court have
worked to ensure that the political process, rather than the courts,
will decide fundamentally political questions concerning government
allocation of funds. Together, the reasoning in Phillips and Eastern
Enterprises poses a potentially serious challenge to each of those
principles. Mrs. Frothingham would be pleased; whether we should
be as well is highly questionable.

